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Palestine Liberation Organisation

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Miscellaneous - Memoranda on Sabotage - Potentials

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(15 November, 1966)

JOINT RESEARCH DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM

The Palestine Liberation Organisation

SUMMARY

A. The foundation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 1964 reflected the general feeling that the Arab Higher Committee, led by Haj Amin al Husseini, had become obsolete and impracticable. The PLC differs from other movements advocating the liberation of Palestine by its policy of prudence. (Paragraphs 1 - 3)

B. The concept of the Palestine Entity and the abortive Palestine National Union established by President Nasser in the Gaza Strip. The concept was revived at the First Arab Summit Conference in 1964 and Ahmed Shuqairi appointed organiser. Jordan was apprehensive of the Entity idea. (Paragraphs 4 - 8)

C. The first Congress of Palestine Refugees, held in Jerusalem during May, 1964, brought the Palestine Liberation Organisation officially into existence and produced a constitution and Nation Charter. Reactions from other liberation movements and Israel. (Paragraphs 9 - 10)

D. The Palestine Liberation Army was officially sanctioned at the Second Arab Summit Conference at Alexandria, September 1964, and plans drawn up for recruitment and training. The PLO and PLA faced difficulties at the end of 1964, mainly owing to inability to define their functions and to limit themselves to realistic goals. Cooperation with the PLO varied among the Arab States, particularly over the provision of financial contributions. Some training facilities were given to the PLA. (Paragraphs 11 - 16)

E. Opposition from Jordan grew during 1965 and permission was refused for PLA training camps to be established there. Shuqairi's courtship of China and the U.S.S.R. increased Jordanian suspicions that the PLO might fall under Communist influence. At the Second Palestine Congress in 1965, President Nasser urged caution in relations with Israel and called for unity among the Arab states. This Congress revealed the internal differences among the PLO Executive. (Paragraphs 17-18)

F. The PLO progressed slowly in 1965. Jordan-Shuqairi relations deteriorated seriously. The Third Arab Summit Conference in September rejected Shuqairi's demands for more powers for the PLO and revealed the general lack of support for the Organisation from the Arab states. More militancy was demanded by many Palestinians and negotiations were conducted with al Fatah. The

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Preparatory Committee for Unified Palestinian Action was formed in February 1966 to pursue a more positive policy. (Paragraphs 19 - 23)

G. A truce was declared between Jordan and the PLO in March 1966 but was virtually stillborn. The Third Palestine Congress at Gaza renewed PLO demands upon Jordan over training facilities, and in June, Shuqairi continued his attacks upon King Hussein. The King's speech at Ajlun in reply completed the rupture between the two. (Paragraphs 24 - 25)

H. Despite the widespread organisation of the PLO, progress has been slow, due mainly to Jordanian opposition to a movement which threatens her sovereignty, and secondly to President Nasser's awareness that the Arab States are not yet prepared to wage war with Israel. It is difficult to estimate how representative the PLO is of the Palestinians themselves, but despite considerable opposition to Shuqairi, the call to liberate Palestine has a strong emotional appeal to Palestine refugees. The main problem facing Shuqairi at present is to make the PLO independent of the Summit Conferences, especially in financial matters. (Paragraphs 26 - 31)

APPENDIX - The Present Structure of the Palestine Liberation Organisation

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION

INTRODUCTION

There are a number of organisations currently in existence whose principal object is the restoration of Israel to Arab rule. Apart from the Palestine Liberation Organisation the most important of these are:- al Fatah (the Palestine Liberation Movement - Harakat al Tahrir al Falastiniya) with its military arm Asifa; the Palestine Liberation Front (Jabhat al Tahrir al Falastiniya); and the Preparatory Committee for Unified Palestinian Action (Al Lajna al Tahdiriya L'il Amal al Falastin).

2. The Palestine Liberation Organisation was founded in May, 1964, at a meeting of Palestinian delegates at Jerusalem following a resolution at the first Arab Summit Conference the previous January. The Arab Higher Committee, formed in 1936, had hitherto been in charge of the reclamation of Palestine for Palestinians, but its leader, the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al Husseini, had become opposed to President Nasser. Husseini claimed that the breach had been caused by accusations levelled against him of misappropriating refugee funds and of intrigue with the Moslem Brotherhood. It is now generally recognised, however, that by the nineteen fifties Nasser regarded the ex-Mufti as a spent force politically, representing a generation whose plans for the recovery of Palestine were obsolete and impracticable. The Summit Conference approved the motion to create an armed force of Palestine refugees, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA).

3. The chief concern of this paper is with the development to date of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), although the other radical and extremist movements such as al Fatah will be referred to in conjunction with the activities of the Palestine refugees. At the time of writing, the military arm of the PLO has not carried out any armed attacks against Israel, and it is the contrast between the PLO's policy of prudence in military affairs, and that of irresponsible violence as practised by al Fatah, which serves to distinguish the two organisations.

II. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS - TO SEPTEMBER, 1966.

The Palestine National Union

4. The concept of a Palestine Entity had been discussed by Arab governments at various times since 1959, when mention was made of a "Palestine Government" to be formed in the Gaza Strip and to consist of representatives from there - an area containing more than 280,000 Palestine refugees - and from the West Bank of the Jordan. The scheme received full backing from the U.A.R. and in 1962, President Nasser promulgated a new temporary Constitution for the Gaza Strip which acknowledged the existence of a "Palestine National Union". This document re-asserted that Gaza was an integral part of Palestine and that all Palestinians should belong to a National Union. The main change in the new Constitution, compared with that issued in 1958, was in the numbers of Palestinian refugee representatives in the Legislative Assembly. The government of the Gaza Strip is military, headed by a Governor-General, with an Executive Council and Legislative Assembly. In the 1958 Constitution, the unofficial membership of the Assembly comprised the President and members of various Municipal and Rural Councils

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of the Gaza Strip, together with four refugees and seven inhabitants of the area nominated by the Executive Council. This representation was now to be replaced by 22 members, to be chosen by the elected members of the local Councils of the Palestine National Union. Article 2, which included most of the innovatory clauses concerning the National Union, provided for a substitution of the phrase "the Palestinians" for the term "inhabitants of the Gaza Sector" used in the earlier Constitution. This new term was intended to include all the residents of the West Bank, and the old argument over the sovereignty of this area was revived between Jordan and the U.A.R. The Palestine National Union remained an abortive effort. It was apparent that control would be vested in Cairo and this caused violent opposition from Haj Amin al Husseini, the then spokesman for all Palestine Unity Plans. The antipathy between Nasser and Husseini made the scheme ineffectual.

The First Arab Summit Conference, January 1964

5. The issue was revived at the First Arab Summit Conference, held in January 1964 at Cairo, when King Hussein, as part of a calculated move towards a more definite Arab posture, withdrew his opposition to the establishment of a Palestine Entity. The Conference was proposed by President Nasser, (who changed abruptly his earlier opinion that such meetings served no constructive purpose) in order to discuss the Jordan Waters problem and also to prevent precipitate action against Israel by the more impulsive of the neighbouring Arab States (e.g. Syria). Ahmed Shuqairi, a Palestinian Arab, whose career included service as a member of the Syrian permanent mission in the United Nations and later as the Saudi Arabian permanent representative there, was appointed by the Conference to be the organiser of the Entity. Although supported by the enlarged Palestinian Department in the Arab League Secretariat, Shuqairi faced considerable opposition to his appointment among Palestinians themselves, since they had not been consulted; but the acquiescence of King Hussein and the backing of President Nasser enabled him to overcome it. Enthusiasm for the Entity idea in such a form owes much to the decision by Jordan and the U.A.R. to sink their differences, but King Hussein's cautious attitude remained. In view of the all-Arab appeal of the Entity, it was impossible for Jordan to reject it outright. It was equally impossible to accept the presence of a "state-within-a-state" which might question Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank, since most of the Palestine refugees lived in this area. King Hussein stated that recognition of such a body could only be given if its headquarters were in Jerusalem and two-thirds of its Congress were selected by the Jordan Government and had no connexion with the Arab Higher Committee or the Palestine National Union. Apart from strong opposition to any form of Entity other than on her own terms, Jordan took the line that Palestine was an all-Arab problem which Palestinians were incapable of solving by themselves, and that only when Palestine had been recovered by concerted action would it be opportune to consult the Palestinians on their national future.

6. Opposition to Shuqairi was soon forthcoming from Haj Amin al Husseini. Accusing Shuqairi of being a Nasserite tool, he claimed that it was not for the Arab League or Heads of State to choose a Palestinian leader, but for the Palestinians themselves. He expressed concern over the rapprochement between Nasser and King Hussein, and his antipathy towards the UAR leader brought him support from several quarters among the Palestine exiles, including the Christians, who showed the most fear of Nasser. He failed,

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however, to evoke a response among exiles on the West Bank, who regarded internal quarrels as disastrous to the formation of an Entity and regarded Husseini as a spoiler. The failure of his own Committee also stood against him.

7. In the months following the first Arab Summit Conference, Shuqairi made a tour of the Arab States to publicise the Palestine Entity and to collect support for it, visiting the Jordanian refugee camps and promising arms and a military organisation. Many Arabs remained sceptical since they did not consider effective action against Israel a present possibility. In March and April, 1964, Shuqairi visited Baghdad, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain and claimed to have received £140,000 from the Gulf States. In each country visited he succeeded in having the idea of a Palestine conference accepted, and established a committee whose main duty was to choose representatives to attend it. Agreement was reached to assemble the conference in May and to hold it in Jerusalem. Many educated Palestinians again disapproved of the arbitrary way in which Shuqairi had decided the method of representation to the Conference and the Arab Higher Committee resolved to boycott it.

The Conference of Palestine Refugees, May 1964

8. The Congress of Palestine Refugees opened on 28 May 1964 in Jerusalem, and was attended by King Hussein. It was boycotted by Haj Amin al Husseini, whose Arab Higher Committee worked from Beirut, but it was a measure of his weakness that although he declined to attend, he nevertheless attempted to nominate some of his followers as delegates. 393 Palestinians attended the Conference, of whom 239 came from Jordan. They divided approximately into three groups. Firstly, those who were pro-Shuqairi, consisting of his nominees to the national preparatory committees; secondly, the anti-Shuqairi contingent who were also opposed to the Arab Higher Committee, but in favour of the Entity; and thirdly, a small pro-Royalist group of Jordanians intent on sabotaging the Congress. The sympathies for and against Shuqairi were brought out in one of the main discussions of the Congress which debated his nomination of delegates to the preparatory committees. This did not, however, prevent his unanimous election as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the name given by the Congress to the new Entity. The Congress produced a Palestine National Charter (paragraph 9 below) and drew up a draft constitution. In addition, it was agreed to set up branch offices of the PLO in all Arab capitals and elsewhere in the world. Membership would be open to all Palestinians over the age of eighteen who would support the Organisation by monthly dues. The chief organ of administration was to be an Executive Committee numbering fifteen, which would be responsible to a National Congress, elected for 3-year terms and whose headquarters would be in Jerusalem, with information offices in Arab and other capitals. (see Appendix I)

9. The relevant passages in the Palestine National Charter, drafted by the Charter Committee at the Congress, provide a good indication of the aims of the new movement and are worth quoting at length:-

1) "..... Palestine, with its borders which existed during the Mandate, is one regional, indivisible unit and the Arab people of Palestine are the legitimate owners of their homelands".

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ii) Palestinians are - "Arab citizens who were normally residents of Palestine until 1947, whether they were forced to leave it or remained. Every person born of a Palestinian Arab father, whether in Palestine or abroad, is also a Palestinian". It also stated that Jews of Palestinian origin were considered Palestinians "if they wish to undertake to live in Palestine with loyalty and peace".

iii) "Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary aims. The fate of the Arab nation and Arab existence are dependent upon the fate of the Palestinian problem. Liberation of Palestine is a national duty, the responsibility of which falls fully on the Arab nation and foremost on the Arab people of Palestine". The Charter also undertakes to - "preserve the holy shrines, freedom of worship and the freedom to visit without discrimination of differentiation in race, colour, language and religion".

iv) The liberation of Palestine from an international viewpoint - "is a defensive action as provided for in the United Nations Charter" and that the Palestine people "look for the support of freedom, justice and peace-loving nations for the restoration of the legitimate conditions to its country and to enable the people of Palestine to exercise their national sovereignty and national movement". The Charter also declares that "the partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel are null and void. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate and whatever resulted from them are also null and void".

v) The Charter provides that the PLO shall exercise no regional sovereignty over the West Bank of Jordan, or Gaza or Al-Hamma (a settlement in a demilitarised belt of land separating the Israel/Syrian/Jordan borders at the south-east end of Lake Tiberias). The PLO is - "responsible for the Palestinian people's liberation, with its own flag, oath and anthem". Other clauses urged the formation of an army within two years, recommended a Palestine Broadcasting station, news agency and information offices and approved the establishment of a National Fund for PLO revenues to be collected from the Palestinian people, Arab nations and friendly states. An oath taken by the delegates to the conference stated that "Palestine is our homeland, repatriation is our goal, struggle is our road, knowledge is our light, faith is our weapon, sacrifice is our duty, unity is our guide. Death does not frighten us. Palestine is ours".

10. Immediate reactions from Israel to the establishment of the PLO were not violent, the general opinion regarding it as no great threat, particularly while there was a moderate régime in Jordan. The only concern shown by Israel was that it might succeed in winning the recognition of the United Nations, although to date this has not occurred, nor is it likely in the foreseeable future. Reactions from extremist Palestinians and Palestine organisations like al Fatah, however, were more positive. They doubted that the PLO, as constituted, would prove an effective force to reclaim Palestine and took steps to infiltrate its ranks and influence its policies.

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The Palestine Liberation Army

11. The Second Arab Summit Conference, held in September, 1964 at Alexandria, endorsed the establishment of the PLO at the Jerusalem Congress. The Palestine Liberation Army was formally brought into existence at this Conference and Colonel Wajih al-Madani, a Palestinian who had previously commanded the Kuwaiti armed forces and already a member of the Executive Committee, was appointed Commander-in-Chief. This body was to act as the military arm of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, although its actual responsibilities have never been defined and remain obscure, principally because both the United Arab Republic and Jordan are reluctant publicly to initiate hostilities with Israel at the present time. It is not connected in any way with al Asifa or with other subversive or terrorist organisations. The confusion about the actual rôle of the PLA reflected the dissension prevalent during the Conference over the entire question of Arab strategy towards Israel. The debate whether this strategy should be offensive or defensive ended with a compromise that while it should be defensive in nature, it should have an offensive objective. This conclusion clarified little of the true aims of the PLA. The different attitude shown towards the PLO during the Second Arab Summit provoked a deterioration of inter-Arab relations.

12. Immediate plans for the Palestine Liberation Army, however, consisted of a system to recruit members and establish training areas and instructors. (see Appendix I) There were several Palestinian units already in existence in the armies of the adjacent Arab states. Two brigades, each of three battalions, and totalling three thousand men, existed in the UAR. There was also a battalion (250 men) embodies in the Iraqi army, although this was little more than a paper organisation. The PLA Brigade in Syria is composed solely of Syrian Palestine troops and is stationed at Deraa. Its present strength is thought to be about 2,200, composed of twelve companies of 180 men. The troops are armed with Russian-made small arms supplied by the Syrian army. The Brigade is entirely independent of the Syrian army and is exclusively under the command of General Wajih al Madani and Ahmed Shuqairi. There were no Palestine units in Jordan as such, but the proportion of Palestinians in the Jordan army itself is approximately fifty per cent, while the National Guard on the West Bank is exclusively Palestinian. King Hussein has argued that with such a large percentage of Palestine refugees in the Jordanian military forces, there was no necessity to form a separate army for them within the kingdom. He has used this argument to refuse permission repeatedly for the establishment of PLA training centres in Jordan. The first of many disputes between King Hussein and Shuqairi occurred in July 1964 over the question of training facilities for the PLA and the situation was not improved by the latter's refusal to accept certain Palestinians nominated by the King to serve on the Executive Committee.

Difficulties Facing the PLO

13. By the end of 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organisation was already beset by administrative problems. Public dissatisfaction mounted in the Jerusalem area during November, sponsored by Haj Amin al Husseini who complained that the leaders of the Organisation had been appointed without consulting the Palestine people. He drew attention to the fact that Jerusalem was not even represented on the Executive Committee. The ex-Mufti regarded

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Shuqairi in the same light as he regarded Nasser, as a Communist, and this view was reinforced when Shuqairi stated his intention to seek technical and military aid for the PLO from Russia and China. Iraq gave 2.3 million dinars to the PLA fund in December, but most of the enthusiasm for military aid came from Syria who, in the same month, proposed a training scheme for officers who had enlisted from the Syrian army into the PLA. Slight progress was reported in recruitment generally among the refugees, but if the intended number of 15,000 in three years was to be reached, it was realised that some form of conscription would be necessary.

14. Besides these organisational difficulties, the PLO was faced also with the problem of choosing which rôle to play in the Arab-Israel dispute. It could work towards becoming the leading organisation with a broad popular base in the struggle to liberate Palestine; alternatively, it might develop into a propaganda/political organisation supporting whatever other Arab countries might do; thirdly, it needed to decide whether to have a guerilla arm or not. The inability to define the functions of the PLO led to differences among the members of the Executive Council and the growing disillusionment of other Palestinian organisations. Early in 1965 al Fatah, demonstrating its impatience with the non-violent policy of the PLO, began to mount Fedayin (Commando) operations into Israel. The principal weakness in the Organisation, however, was its reluctance to limit itself to realistic goals - to instil a feeling of nationalism into a widely scattered Palestine population, and to form them into a coherent body. In addition, a more reliable source of income than occasional fund-raising tours around the Arab States by Shuqairi was essential. At the Second Arab Summit a fund had been voted for the PLO, including £1 million for administration and £9 million for the PLA, but when viewed in more realistic terms of where the contributions would come from, this amount was reduced in expectations to between £3-4 million. Kuwait promised £2 million, Saudi Arabia £1 million and Iraq £500,000. Cooperation with the PLO varied among the Arab States. The UAR was perhaps the most helpful, offering training facilities and broadcasting time, both of which were readily accepted. Syria showed a willingness to help, despite a certain anti-Shuqairi feeling prevalent in Damascus. Jordan made a show of offering facilities which did not materialise, while King Feisal of Saudi Arabia scarcely concealed his dislike of Shuqairi, who at one time in his career had been dismissed from the position of Saudi Arabian representative at the United Nations. Feisal supplied aid, but only to keep in line with other Arab states. Kuwait supplied her contribution but enthusiasm blew hot and cold for Palestine, while other Gulf States were only moderately encouraging. In the Lebanon, official recognition was transferred from the Arab Higher Committee - the ex-Mufti was requested to close his offices in Beirut - to the PLO, and semi-diplomatic status was similarly transferred to its representative in the Lebanon, Shafiq al Hut. (see Appendix I) But when the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs was approached by Shuqairi in February, 1965, and informed that the PLO suffered from a shortage of funds due to the reluctance of some states to pay their contributions, he merely advised Shuqairi to bring the matter up at the forthcoming Council of the Arab League in March.

PLA Recruitment and Training

15. A concentrated effort to expand the activities of the embryonic Liberation Army was begun at the beginning of 1965. Representatives were sent to refugee camps to recruit support while various training

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grounds were suggested. Kuwait, having refused more than an allowance to clothe PLA troops the previous December, agreed reluctantly to provide some facilities. Shuqairi improved his standing in Syria during December, and in the same month Colonel Madani paid a visit to Damascus and persuaded the Syrians to open their military school to PLA officers. By January, Shuqairi was able to announce that training in Syria had started. In February, it was agreed to place the PLA under the Unified Arab Command (UAC), to allay fears that it might become a threat to the sovereignty of the States in which it was allowed to operate (see Appendix I). Other training grounds, in the Gaza Strip and Iraq, were also provided. After training, the Palestinian troops were to be sent to Gaza where units would be put at the disposal of the UAC and equipped with Russian arms. Colonel Madani cooperated well with the UAC, but was suspicious of Shuqairi who gave several indications of wanting to control the army.

Jordanian Opposition to PLO

16. In March, 1965 a twelve-man delegation led by Shuqairi visited China and plans were laid to establish a mission in Peking. Jordan showed considerable concern over Shuqairi's visit, mainly at the prospect of the PLO becoming infected with China's extremist ideas. Secondly, the prospect of greatly increased military aid would make the task of keeping a strict control over the PLO within Jordanian frontiers increasingly difficult. Even the Soviet Union had demurred from giving much support, in deference to the newly established diplomatic relations with Amman, but China had little to lose and readily accepted the Palestine mission which was set up in Peking, giving it quasi-diplomatic status. In May, however, the Soviet government invited a delegation of the PLO to visit Moscow to discuss financial assistance.

17. Jordan continued to be the principal opponent to Shuqairi's plans for the PLO and in May the Government banned the demonstrations arranged for the anniversary of the United Nations Partition of Palestine. The "Voice of Palestine", radio mouthpiece of the PLO, attacked Jordan for her antipathy and received a rebuttal by the Prime Minister, Wasfi Tel, who issued a statement referring to Jordan's adherence to the findings of the two Arab Summit Conferences in 1964 which established the PLO, but without mentioning the PLO itself. He claimed that the "Voice of Palestine" was not the Organisation's official mouthpiece, and in answer to its accusation that the Jordanian Government was preventing the PLA from functioning properly within her borders, stated the official view that the Jordan Army was, in fact, the "Army of Palestine" - a view noted by the Summit Conference - and therefore Jordan could not be accused of not working for the recapture of Palestine. President Nasser supported Jordan's refusal to train PLA units, rebuking Shuqairi and warning him to discontinue radio attacks.

The Second Palestine Congress, 1965

18. At the opening of the Second Palestine National Congress on 31 May 1965, in Cairo, Nasser's speech underlined the UAR'S current policy towards the Palestine question. He called for unity among Arab States for the restoration of Palestine and maintained that nothing could be achieved by internal dissension. He referred to the walk-out by Shuqairi at the recent Arab Heads of State meeting and defended the Arab League against Syrian attacks. The League, he argued, must not be dissolved, but must be understood. It worked towards the unity of action of all Arab States. Until unity was achieved, little could be done to regain the Palestine homeland. The speech emphasized the dilemma of Nasser's support of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Conflicting with his official sanction of the movement to liberate Palestine was the more practical

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restraint of knowing that the Arab states were not yet ready to engage Israel in war. Jordan and Lebanon, the most reluctant of the other states within the Arab League to mount an attack on Israel, both endorsed this view. The Congress went on to outline the financial difficulties of the Organisation. It referred to the appropriation at the Second Arab Summit Conference of £10 million for the PLO and PIA but stated that only a small part of this had been collected. (See paragraph 14.) The Organisation was currently trying to raise its own long-term budgets through the Palestine National Fund, approved at the First Palestine Congress (paragraph 9), which intended to collect contributions and percentages of income (3-5%) of all Palestinians, host States permitting. Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait and Algeria agreed to the proposition. An annual budget was drawn up totalling more than JD 3 million, over two million of which was to go towards financing the "military department". The amount required was to be gained from annual contributions (JD 1 million), a Palestine Liberation Tax (JD 250,000) and miscellaneous sources (JD 1.8 million). Scores of officials had been appointed to PLO branches in the Arab States, and elsewhere, and in March the radio station, situated in Cairo, came into operation. The Ba'athist and Communist delegates criticised the salaries of the Organisation - an Arab Higher Command pamphlet attacking Shuqairi claimed he was receiving £1,068 per month plus expenses - and caused Shuqairi to tender his resignation when asked to reply to the charges. He later withdrew it and promised that he would seek collaboration with Husseini and the AHC in the future. He solicited and received support for his re-election to the Chairmanship of the Organisation and was also elevated to the Presidency of the National Council. The considerable internal differences already mentioned within the Executive Committee of the PLO became apparent during the Second Palestine Conference. Members of this Committee clashed with members of the National Council and finally a new Executive Committee was selected.

19. The progress of the PLO during the summer months of 1965 was desultory. Training of 200 volunteers began in Kuwait and despite local doubts expressed about the suitability of the excessively hot climate of the region where the camp was situated, three quarters of them finished the course in September. A PLO Research Centre began operations in Beirut to help a publicity drive, and plans were laid to extend the drive as far as South America. 150 recruits were allowed to be conscripted from the refugee camps in the Lebanon after the Government had had discussions with the Iraqi and UAR Governments. 350 trainees were prepared for a military course in Iraq.

20. Relations between Shuqairi and Jordan began to deteriorate seriously from late August 1965. Asked again for assistance on behalf of the PLA, Jordan repeated the assertions made earlier in the year that she regarded her own army as a Palestinian army and thus could not accept the necessity to train a separate force. Shuqairi countered by maintaining that the PLA was essential, since it was based on Russian arms and Russian tactics, whereas the Jordanian army, dependent upon Western aid, techniques and equipment, would never be allowed by the West to attack Israel. An attempt by ex-Palestinians in the Jordan Army to reach a compromise with the PLA failed.

The Third Arab Summit Conference, September 1965

21. The Third Arab Summit Conference was held at Casablanca in September. The important points which emerged from it were the lack of effective support from the Conference for the PLO and the

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feeling of separation between the PLO and the Conference. Shuqairi made ten main requests concerning the power to enforce conscription for Palestinians living in Arab countries, and the adoption of agreed protocol dealing with particular questions concerning questions of travel, residence and work. Most of the proposals, however, involved the granting of all the necessary facilities and immunities to the PLA Command which it would need to carry out the task required of it. Shuqairi also complained that Jordan, Syria and Kuwait had rejected these demands outright, reserving most of his censure for Jordan. The Executive Committee of the PLO, which had already proposed a rebellion against the Hashemite family and the East Bank, and a strike to affect all high-ranking Palestinians in the Jordanian Government, tended its resignation when these motions were answered by an appeal from Nasser to stop using the Voice of Palestine radio as a weapon with which to harass Jordan. The Committee was reminded that this contravened the Summit resolution of 1964 calling upon Arab states to stop attacking each other.

22. The Summit Conference rejected Shuqairi's renewed demands for the military training of refugees in the respective Arab States and the levying of special taxes with which to finance the PLO. It went on to reject his resignation which he tendered in protest to what he considered to be non-cooperation. The Conference suggested that the PLO should contact each member state individually about these matters - a move which Shuqairi had already found to be unsatisfactory. It proved a considerable disappointment to him and he threatened to withdraw the PLO from all future Summit meetings (although it resolved to charge the Unified Arab Command in conjunction with the PLO to go ahead with the formation of Palestine units provided for in the 'second phase' of the plan for the Palestine Army).

More Militant Action demanded

23. Towards the end of 1965, there were further discussions between the PLO and al Fatah. Efforts by Shuqairi in this direction have so far failed in view of al Fatah's insistence on freedom from PLO control. However, particularly since the Third Summit Conference of September, 1965, and Shuqairi's impasse with the Jordanian Government, many PLO leaders and rank and file members, impatient at the inactivity of their own organisation, increasingly favoured some form of collaboration.

PLO-Jordanian Relations, 1966

24. During February 1966, a meeting was held in Beirut of "left wing" and "progressive" organisations interested in Palestine, including the Ba'ath, Qawmi and Communist parties. The Preparatory Committee for Unified Palestinian Action was formed at the meeting which resolved to make the mission of reclaiming Palestine a more militant and single-minded issue than it had been hitherto under the leadership of the PLO. This Committee issued a memorandum at the Palestine National Congress held in Gaza during May calling for more concerted action against Israel and a "firm and definite" plan for the future of the Organisation. At a meeting in Cairo during the last week of February, 1966, between a Jordanian delegation and the leaders of the PLO, their breach was given the appearance of having been repaired. (In October, the previous year, the Jordanian Council of Ministers had improved the situation slightly by stating that the quarrel was with Shuqairi personally and not with the PLO or its aims.) A communiqué issued on 1 March listed the subjects discussed and showed that the PLO had gained several useful privileges. The movement was given permission to establish new offices within Jordan, greater freedom to conduct propaganda activities inside the country and direct radio communications between their head office in Jerusalem and offices abroad. The

/Jordan

Jordan Government also undertook to levy taxes on behalf of the PLO from Jordanian government employees.

25. These concessions, however, amounted to little more than similar ones granted by other Arab countries, which King Hussein could have allowed from the beginning. The main demand by Shuqairi - that Palestinians living in Jordan could be conscripted into the PLO - was evaded. It was expected that the Jordanian authorities would continue to maintain a strict vigilance on PLO activities, since any augmentation of these activities within the Kingdom would tend to inhibit the 'Jordanisation' of ex-Palestinians and hence perpetuate the division between East and West Bank communities. The Third Congress of the PLO was held in Gaza during May and Shuqairi renewed his demands that Jordan should allow PLA training and should relax the restrictions placed upon Palestine activists. He mentioned promises of military aid from China and described his meeting with Kosygin in Cairo earlier, forecasting further co-operation between the PLO and the USSR. The sum of all these actions was to renew Jordanian suspicions about the political nature of the PLO. The entente between the King and Shuqairi, was virtually still-born and on 7 June, 1966 the latter renewed his attacks on Jordan and complained that only an insignificant part of its commitments towards the PLO had been carried out. King Hussein replied on 14 June in a speech at Ajlun and said that he had lost all hope of co-operating with the PLO in its present form in view of the subversive characters of those running it.

III CONCLUSION

26. The Palestine Liberation Organisation has offices or representatives in Beirut, Baghdad, Khartoum, Belgrade, Kuwait, Jerusalem (where a branch of the Arab Higher Committee was established in May 1965 to counter PLO activities), Gaza, Cairo, Damascus, Lahore, Tripoli (Libya), Qatar, Geneva, Washington, New York, Chile and Peking. (See Appendix I) For the sake of economy it shares offices with the Arab League in most Arab cities and only in Washington, Lahore and Jerusalem does it maintain separate accommodation. The Algiers office closed in September 1965, following the resignation of the staff which was probably due to differences with the new Algerian régime. The Organisation enjoys official Chinese support and the Peking office was established in May 1965. China has overtly agreed to furnish the PLO with arms and financial assistance and PLO members are said to have received military training in Communist China.

27. Despite the widespread representation of the Organisation, actual progress towards its professed aims have been slow. This has been due partly to an ambivalent attitude by several Arab States towards it, an attitude best illustrated by the UAR. President Nasser has officially sanctioned the movement to liberate Palestine but is fully aware that the Arab States are not yet prepared for a war with Israel. There is little doubt that Nasser originally sponsored the PLO as a means by which he might put pressure upon Jordan. By September, 1965, UAR-Jordanian relations were reasonably amicable and President Nasser alienated the Executive Committee of the PLO by appealing for an end to its attacks on Jordan via the 'Voice of Palestine' radio station. (Paragraph 21).

28. The other principal cause of the Organisation's insecure position is the general fear among the Arab States that it will develop into a supra-national and subversive body in the service of the UAR. Jordan, more than any other Arab State, has reason to distrust an organisation which, by claiming the loyalties of all Palestinian refugees, threatens her sovereignty in many areas, particularly the West Bank. This conflict is at present causing serious trouble between Shuqairi and King Hussein, who maintains

/the old

the old argument that the Jordanian army, with its high percentage of Palestinian refugees, is the true Palestine army. The Jordanian Government, consequently, is reluctant to offer facilities to the Palestine Liberation Army within the Kingdom. The military wing of the Organisation has developed only in a desultory fashion for the reasons given, namely that until the Arab States feel more confident of waging war against Israel, it serves no practical purpose.

29. These problems pose the question of how far the PLO is representative of the Palestinians themselves. Such a judgment is not easy to make, but it has been suggested that no Palestinian outside Jordan takes either the Organisation or its Chairman seriously, and that Nasser appointed the buffoon-like Shuqairi as Chairman in order to underline its relative unimportance. But it is also true to say that although Shuqairi is discredited and despised throughout Jordan, his radio broadcasts have nevertheless had a considerable effect, and it is from this source and this alone that he derives his undeniable influence. The consciousness of being a separate people is of great psychological importance to the West Bank, both in the immediate present and in building future dreams of a Palestine Arab Government destined to take over from a defeated Israel. No true Palestinian can discount such a contingency, however improbable it may seem, without sounding like a traitor, and the nub of the Jordanian Government's present problem is to convince Palestinians that any practical solution of the Palestine problem lies in solid co-operation among themselves.

30. There are indications, although no proof to date, that Shuqairi may be drawing nearer to the illegal organisations like al Fatah. Increasing impatience among the Palestine Liberation Organisations for action has also resulted in readiness for a rapprochement with extremist bodies and it may well occur that the more impulsive members of the PLO will move closer to the extremist groups. Al Fatah's active policy of violence in Israel is a considerable embarrassment to the PLO, which appears ineffective by comparison. Negotiations between the two have so far failed, due to the inability to find a compromise in their attitude towards the liberation of Palestine. The PLO sought to bring al Fatah under its control, whereas al Fatah tried to persuade the PLO to cooperate with it in violent activities in Israel. There is, however, good evidence that the UAR would like to "take over" al Fatah/Asifa, and the fact that its main leaders are pro-Egyptian makes it likely that the UAR will succeed in her aim of bringing it under the wing of the PLO.

31. The main problem which faces Shuqairi is the dependence of the PLO and PLA upon the Arab Summit Conference, especially in budgetary matters. With the cancellation of a proposed Fourth Summit Conference in September 1966, Shuqairi might well declare his independence of such meetings, but if such independence is to be achieved, he must secure alternative sources of revenue. This inevitably will demand severe economies in the present administration and a reduction in in employment in many branch offices of the Organisation. The National Council at the Third Palestine Congress held at Gaza during May, 1966, attempted to draw up an alternative financial plan which included this contingency and agreed also that henceforth the greater part of the revenue of the Palestine National Fund should be allotted to the needs of the PLA. Whether the PLO can exist independently of the Summit Conferences, and whether it will succeed in collecting revenue from the Arab States are two problems that it must face in the coming year.

SECRET

APPENDIX

THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION



i). The PLA was placed under the control of the UAC to allay suspicions that it might endanger the sovereignty of the States in which it trained.

ii). The Executive Committee, originally fifteen in number, was reduced to twelve at the Gaza Congress, 1966.

iii). The regional office Beirut is the most active of PLO branches. Many of the other branch offices are of notional value only (Chile, Geneva etc.)

iv). The PLO is officially centred in Cairo, but most of the HQ personnel and permanent staff are stationed in Jerusalem with the National Council and Executive Committee offices.

v). Two hundred volunteers trained in Kuwait in 1965; 350 prepared for training in Iraq; HQ of the PLA is in Gaza to which trained PLA volunteers are sent and placed under the command of the UAC. No reliable figures of trainees sent to China are available. The Palestine Brigade in Syria is stationed at Deraa and consists of approximately 2,200 personnel. (see paragraph 12). The target strength for the PLA in Syria is put at 5,000 by the end of 1967.

SECRET

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S.1078/2/66

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15
- 9 JAN 1967
E2/4

BRITISH EMBASSY
BEIRUT
31 December 1966

Dear Alan,

We have received from Research Department under a compliments slip numbered LR.6/64 a copy of a memorandum entitled The Palestine Liberation Organization. The distribution list at the end of this memorandum includes the Development Division here under the category of Local Intelligence Committees.

2. There is no need for Dev.Div. to have a copy of this memorandum (or others like it) and we have destroyed it. But what is worse is that copies of the memorandum and presumably of the distribution list have been sent to those U.S. Agencies who will now be persuaded that Dev.Div. is something other than what it really is.

3. The Ambassador would be grateful if you could do whatever is possible to correct this impression and arrange with Research Department and other branches of the Office that nothing similar happens in the future.

Yours ever
James Craig

(A.J.M. Craig)

A.C. Goodison Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

Happy new year

SECRET

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2/4

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

27 January, 1967.

Distribution of material to Development Division, Beirut

I am writing in reply to your letter No. S.1078/2/66 of 31 December to Alan Goodison (who has now left us) about a copy of the memorandum on the Palestine Liberation Organization being sent to Development Division.

2. The listing of the Development Division in the distribution list as a Local Intelligence committee was a printer's error which should not have occurred. Fortunately, copies of Research Department papers sent to U.S. agencies do not have the distribution list attached, and so the harm done is less than you feared.

3. In investigating this mistake we have discovered that Research Department have been sending their memoranda to the Development Division at the latter's request. We have asked them to limit this in future to memoranda on economic, commercial or development subjects. If at any time you think that the Development Division should see other Research Department memoranda outside these categories, we will arrange for copies to be sent in individual cases when you advise that this should be done.

(J.C. Moberly)

A.J.M. Craig, Esq.,
Beirut.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DRAFT 1 attd

Type 1 +

To:—

A.J.M. Craig
Beirut

From

M. McAuley
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

Distribution of material to Dev. Div, Beirut

I am writing in reply to your
letter No. S.1078/2/66
of 31 December to Mac
Coodison (who has now left us)
about a copy of the memorandum
on the Palestine Liberation
Organization being sent to
Development Division.

The misunderstanding
is regretted and I hope
that there will not be a
repetition.

/2

I.R.D. Head
(see minute)

M. McAuley

M.L. Saunders
25/1

(83126) St.S.

2. I was forwarded
misinformation
The listing of the Development
Division in the distribution list
as a Local Intelligence
Committee was a printer's
error which SHOULD not have
occurred. Fortunately
copies of Research Department
papers sent to U.S agencies
do not have the distribution
list annexed, and so the
harm done is (we hope)
small.

3. In investigating this
mistake we have discovered
that Research Department
have been sending their
memoranda to the Development

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(83126) St.S.

Division at my father's request.
We have asked them to write
this in future to memoranda
on economic, commercial or
development subjects. If
at any time you think
that ~~any~~ a Development
Division (and the Finance Department
Finance Corporation) other memoranda outside
we will arrange for copies
to be sent in individual cases
when you advise that this
should be done.

Jam.
27/

Reference E2/4

It is indeed a pity the Development Division was listed under Local Intelligence Committees. It is not and never has been one.

I submit a draft from the Secretary.

A.C.S.
25/1

I do not, however, wish to write and advise Mr. Mobsby — further circulation to appropriate departments

I do agree that this is unfortunate, but it was due to circumstances beyond our control. When the memorandum left our hands for typing the Dev. Div was shown clearly on the distribution sheet under the sub-heading "Others". These responsible for preparing the original memorandum the Cycle-styling apparently omitted this

heading with the words State Dep. appears as an L.A. Condition. We do not see points 1 & 2 memoranda for checking 1 printing errors, but we have provided this one but I know responsible for each of will not occur again.

2. Distribution Lists on the UK eyes only can not attached to copies sent to us agencies so that the error is not as frequent as appears at first sight.

3. We have been sending copies of the memoranda to the Dep. Div. for some time because they asked us to do so. We note with from James Craig's letter that they asked how copies of only some. We should therefore be grateful for guidance on what they should not.

R. Ward

Ends/mf
26/1

Reference.....

I have amended the draft in the light of JRD's comments.

J. Cropper
27.1

Mr Saunders

J.R.D. 27/1.

J.R.D. a/a (to note paragraph 3 of my note to Mr Craig).

(3)

E2/4

THE "PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION" POSITION ON SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN ISRAEL

January 1965 - March 1967

This paper was left by Mr Tagger on 22/3/67. Ref to 28/3

General

1. The "Palestine Liberation Organization" was set up according to the decision of the Arab Summit Conference that met in January 1964 on the initiative of Abdul Gamal Nasser. As far back as 1959, Nasser put forward the idea of creating a Palestinian "identity" or "entity" as a tool in his hands for the inter-Arab conflict.

2. The issue of the Palestinian "identity" was first raised by the Egyptians at the Arab League meeting of September 1959 that took place in Casablanca. The purpose of the Egyptians, on the surface, was to give the Palestinians the responsibility of being the "pioneers in the Liberation of the Plundered Homeland" but, in effect, Egypt's intention was to turn Palestinian activity into a subversive weapon against those states that opposed Egypt, primarily Jordan. The proposal also served somewhat to raise Nasser's prestige in the Arab world.

3. Prior to the meeting of the Arab Summit Conference in January 1964, Ahmed Shukeiry was appointed as the Palestinian representative in the Arab League, on Egypt's initiative. He also attended the Summit Conference in this capacity. Shukeiry was appointed chairman of the P.L.O. The Second Arab Summit Conference, that met in Alexandria in September 1964, recognized the existence of the Palestine Liberation Organization."

4. The P.L.O., being a creation of the Summit Conference and open to Egyptian influence, in the beginning held to the "orthodox" Arab viewpoint on everything connected with the campaign against Israel and with the Palestine struggle. As a result, it opposed all terrorist activity that could lead to war before the total Arab preparations were completed. With the collapse of the Summit Conferences and the growing prestige of the terrorist organizations in Arab public opinion, the position of the P.L.O. became more radical and it began to take more active measures. At the beginning, this found expression in a radical change in its propaganda by adopting slogans of "immediate fedayun struggle." Later, the organization began sabotage activity of limited scope--and in no case from the Gaza Strip. In the first stage of this activity, there was a subversive and sabotage effort directed against Jordan, in co-operation with Syria and the "Fatah". Later, the P.L.O. began sabotage in Israel from across the Jordanian and Lebanese borders.

The Development of the P.L.O. Position on Sabotage Activity -- Main Stages

5. The position of the P.L.O. on sabotage activity in Israel passed through a number of stages as a result of the inter-Arab struggle over the "Palestine Topic", in particular, as a result of Egypt's position in this struggle and as a result of the changes that occurred in the "Fatah" sabotage activities in Israel (i.e., the growing Syrian support).

6. It should be emphasized that whereas the P.L.O. was set up at the beginning of 1964, it was the "Fatah" which began sabotage activity at the beginning of 1965. The "Fatah" began these activities as a result of their over-all extremist concepts and from the need both to justify their independent existence and policies and not to become a part of the P.L.O.

7. The P.L.O. position in regard to sabotage activity can be divided into four main stages:

   a. From the beginning of 1965 to the middle of 1966 -- strong opposition to the "immediate" sabotage activities of "Fatah"

   b. Contact with the "Fatah" in an attempt to bring them into the P.L.O. and stop their activities

c. From the middle of 1966, propaganda support by the P.L.O. leaders and radio for sabotage and fedayun activities, with emphasis on the fact that the P.L.O. is a "revolutionary fedayun organization."

d. From October 1966, the P.L.O. began to carry out a number of sabotage in Israel using the "Heroes of the Return" organization, co-operating with the "Units in the Name of Abed Kadar el-Husseini", and through co-ordination with Syria.

First Stage: The P.L.O. Opposes Immediate Sabotage Activity

8. Immediately after the first announcement of the "Fatah" on the execution of sabotage activities in Israel, in the beginning of 1965, the P.L.O. spokesmen showed their opposition to these activities and saw in them a deviation from the over-all Arab policies. Their policies, in practice, fit in with the Egyptian position, which had the primary influence on the organization. The P.L.O. saw in the "Fatah" activities damage to itself and an undermining of its status. This approach characterized the P.L.O. position then and continued until the middle of 1966. It should be emphasized that the opposition of the P.L.O. was not to the execution of sabotage activities as a way of waging war on Israel, but rather to their timing and the need for these activities to be carried out at the proper time within the overall Arab framework (that is to say, under the direction and supervision of Egypt and the P.L.O.) and not independently. This position was influenced by the Egyptian concept which held that sabotage activities could involve the Arab states in a war with Israel before they were ready.

9. The following quotations reflect P.L.O. policy during this period:

a. The Lebanese newspaper El-Hiyat of 3 January 1965 published the following announcement of the Beirut office of the P.L.O.: "The office of the P.L.O. in Lebanon denies all connection with the announcement in the name of the General Command of the "Fatah" Forces. On this opportunity the office of the Palestine Liberation Organization emphasizes that any Palestinian military action against Israel is within the authority of the Palestine Liberation Army which is the only body responsible for the military mobilization of the sons of the Palestinian People for the Liberation of Conquered Palestine..."

b. From Ahbar Falestine, a newspaper appearing in the Gaza Strip, of 15 March 1965: In a press conference that Shukeiry held in the Gaza Strip , he stated, in reply to a question on the P.L.O. stand on the "Fatah" actions, that "the Liberation Organization cannot but salute every organized fedayun action whose goal is liberation and follows the united Arab plan, but it is better not to support such activities at present..."

c. The pro-Egyptian Lebanese newspaper Kafaakh of 16 June 1965: "Shukeiry proclaimed that he wanted to establish contact with all the other existing Palestinian organizations, although he agrees with their objective but not with the timing of the execution..."

d. The Lebanese newspaper Falestine of 30 December 1966: Shafit El Hut, head of the P.L.O. office in Beirut, told a correspondent of the paper, "In regard to the limited fedayun activity carried out by certain revolutionary Palestinian organizations... We fear lest this activity lead to reprisal actions on the part of the enemy, as occurred at Kalkilya and Jenin, and thus our loss will be greater than our profit; thus this activity would cause a decline in the morale of the sons of the Palestinian People dwelling along the border..."

e. The Iraqi newspaper El Thora El Arabiya of 15 May 1966: "The newspaper's reporter asked the director of the P.L.O. on the sabotage activity of the 'Fatah'. He replied casting doubt on the value of the activity of a few persons, saying: 'If we ask ourselves if the actions of these few persons will bring about the Liberation of Palestine... The concept of the P.L.O. is not to view just the Palestine Problem and to isolate it from all the Arab states... In accordance with this view the organization is working to implement a well-examined

plan for the full liberation of Palestine and the Palestinian People will be the spear-head and the entire Arab nation will carry full national responsibility..."

Second Stage: The P.L.O. Establishes Contact with "Fatah"

With the continuation, with Syrian support, of sabotage activity, the P.L.O. began to fear that they would lose their position in the Palestinian leadership within the Arab world, since the "Fatah" and the Syrians had actual deeds to show in the "Liberation of Palestine" while the P.L.O. continued to hold to the policies of the Summit. These policies held that it was not yet the proper time for sabotage activities--because of the fear of Israeli response. With this in mind, Shukeiry began to establish contact with the "Fatah" leaders, intending to bring them into the P.L.O. and thus supervise their activities. These attempts, which continued in the beginning of 1966, failed to achieve results not only because the Syrians had increased their influence over the "Fatah" but also because the "Fatah" leaders were unwilling to give up their initiative.

11. The attempts at communication between the P.L.O. and "Fatah" found expression in the Arab press and radio:

a. Radio London, the Arabic program on 15 June 1965: At a press conference he held in Beirut, Shukeiry said that he "is in contact with the 'Fatah' organization which carries out attacks on Israel and acts of sabotage within it..."

b. Radio Bagdad on 15 July 1965: Shukeiry stated that he "still continues the contact with the different Palestinian organizations, secret and open, in order to bring them into the P.L.O. or to co-ordinate activities with them..."

c. The Lebanese newspaper El Ahad of 15 August 1965: In a conversation with the paper's correspondent, Shukeiry said: "The final position of the P.L.O. on the 'Fatah' forces will be determined in the final stage of talks with them. We have not yet reached this stage... Soon another meeting with the authorities of the 'Fatah' organization will be set."

d. The Lebanese newspaper El Hiyat on 8 February 1966: Speaking of the contacts between the P.L.O. and other Palestinian organizations, the paper wrote that " efforts are being made to unite all the members of the Palestinian parties into one front with the P.L.O. For this purpose all the representatives met in the P.L.O. office in Beirut. The participants of the convention attempted to convince the 'Fatah' organization to take part in their meetings but without any results since this organization refuses to take part in any meetings."

Third Stage: P.L.O. Propaganda Supports Fedayun Activity

12. From about May 1966, the leaders of the P.L.O. and its radio program, which is broadcast on Radio Cairo, began to express support for sabotage activities in Israel. The P.L.O. also began to present itself as a fedayun body, in order to guard its inter-Arab status. This shift in the position of the organization, and Egypt's permission for the P.L.O. to take this propaganda line, stem from the following factors:

a. The support of Arab public opinion for the sabotage activity of the "Fatah" led Shukeiry to "swim with the current" and express an extreme position; this took place at a time when "Fatah" was already under the full influence of the Syrians

b. With the increased intensity of the inter-Arab struggle which came as a result of the collapse of the "summit atmosphere" at Nasser's instigation in July 1966 and with the renewal of subversive activity against the Hussein regime, the P.L.O. was turned into a tool of subversion by the Egyptians.

13. The background of this change in the position of the P.L.O. was explained by Mishel Abu Juda, the editor of the Lebanese newspaper Al Nahar, in an article in his paper on 17 June 1966:

"It seems that the increasing support of the Syrian government for the activities of 'Fatah', or at least their distribution of the proclamations on the operations of the organization, led Shukeiry to act in a more practical and realistic manner toward the activities of "Fatah" or to adopt this method of action. This approach followed the tendency of Shukeiry's circle and comrades to adopt fedayun activity on the Palestine scene."

14. On the future trends in the P.L.O. stand Abu Juda pointed out in an article in Al Nahar on 16 June 1966: "The shortest and most striking things that Shukeiry said were those that emphasized that his organization is a fedayun organization. It may be that the day will come when words about the P.L.O. will be similar to those on 'Assifa' ('Fatah'), that is to say actions at Almagor, Tiberias, Natanyia and Tel Aviv..."

15. The following are typical of propaganda statements of the P.L.O. on sabotage during this stage:

a. The Iraqi newspaper Al Thora Al Arabiya of 15 May 1966: The head of the P.L.O.'s Bagdad office, Daud Uda, stated to a reporter asking about the "Fatah" activities: "The P.L.O. views with esteem the actions of valour and sacrifice executed by Palestinian youth... These fedayun activities stir the spirits of the Sons of Palestine and they identify with them..."

b. In reply to a question of a reporter from the pro-Egyptian Lebanese newspaper El Thoriya (article published on 5 September 1966), Ahmed Shukeiry stated, "Fighting fedayun action is the way of the Palestinian people; the P.L.O. is a fighting revolutionary organization which sets its eyes to the first appropriate moment in order to open fedayun activity according to overall plans..."

c. In an interview published in the Lebanese weekly Al Thoriya on 21 November 1966, Shukeiry stated: "The P.L.O. supports fedayun action and makes of it an example. The P.L.O. salutes those who fell on the field of battle..."

d. Shukeiry stated before Palestinian students in Cairo (reported on the P.L.O. radio program of 21 November 1966): "The fedayun are the foremost of the Palestine people and they are its heroes. The fedayun way is the way to Liberation and we are proud of it. Our way is armed struggle. Even if Hussein is angered over the fedayun we will not be deterred but will continue, with more force, the Campaign of Liberation."

e. From the statement of Shukeiry in the Arab Defence Council (reported on the P.L.O. radio program of 11 December 1966): "Out of necessity the Palestinian fedayun activity will have the pioneering role in the Liberation Campaign without need for any form of permission."

f. The P.L.O. radio program of 21 January 1967: Shukeiry stated that "explosives exploding in Israel are the work of Palestinians and this opens a new hope for the Return to Palestine."

g. The P.L.O. radio program of 2 February 1967: Shukeiry stated, "The Palestine fedayun are heroes of Liberation and have the right to enter Palestine whether by peace or by war."

h. Shukeiry to a correspondent of a German radio station in Koln (reported on the P.L.O. radio program on 10 February 1967): "Two campaigns stand before the fedayun activity on the two fronts of Jordan and Israel. This multiplies the heroism of the fedayun and adds to the Palestinian struggle honor and firm determination. The fedayun irrevocably intend to continue in these two campaigns despite the anger and rage of Israel and King Hussein; the Palestinian people will not abandon its goals and will continue on the road to Liberation until the end.

16. Shukeiry claimed that the character of the P.L.O. is revolutionary, stating (in the Lebanese newspaper El Muhrar of 21 November 1966): "The P.L.O. must be regarded as a fedayun, fighting, revolutionary , liberationist organization...therefore the P.L.O. supports the fedayun [redacted]tions and praises them"

Fourth Stage: The P.L.O. Takes Part in Sabotage Actions in Israel

17. Beginning in October 1966, the P.L.O. went from verbal support and propaganda assistance to, and the execution of, sabotage actions in Israel and Jordan. The P.L.O. had contact and influence with the "Heroes of the Return", which was centered in Lebanon, and the "Units in the Name of Abd El Kadar El Husseini", based in Jordan, both of which carried out sabotage in Israel.

18. "The Heroes of the Return"

a. Although this body is connected with the "Komyan El Arab Movement" (Arab Nationalists) in Lebanon, the P.L.O. co-operates with it in everything concerned with sabotage activities in Israel. This body, which serves the P.L.O., operates Palestinian mercenaries in Lebanon.

b. Shafik El Hut, the director of the P.L.O. office in Beirut, heads the organization and operation of saboteurs of the "Heroes of the Return" organization in Lebanon. The majority of the meetings of the activists of this organization take place in his office.

19. "Units in the Name of Abd El Kadar El Husseini"

These units exist in Jordan; they are connected with the P.L.O. and probably with the Syrians as well. They have carried out two sabotage actions in Israel, in the Jerusalem area. The radio program of the P.L.O. handles propaganda for these units.

20. Examples of P.L.O. statements identifying with these units:

a. From a speech of Shukeiry to students in Cairo (reported on the P.L.O. radio program on 27 November 1966): "You students represent the pioneers of revolutionary Palestine; this afternoon I will go to Headquarters and you go to sign up... If you read on the name Abd El Kadar El Husseini... Do not forget to stress the name Abd El Kadar El Husseini...This is an order of the P.L.O. to you..."

b. The P.L.O. radio program on 3 February 1967 quotes leaflets that were distributed in Jordan on behalf of "Units of Abd El Kadar El Husseini". At the end of the text appears "Long live the Revolutionary Council"; the reference is to the Palestinian Revolutionary Council set up by Shukeiry on 27 December 1966.

21. The shift in the position of the P.L.O. can be explained on the background of the following factors:

a. The continuation of the sabotage activities of the "Fatah" lowered the prestige of the P.L.O. and led it to carry out its proclamations on the "fedayun nature" of the organization by the execution of sabotage acts in Israel.

b. As a result of the increasing struggle between the P.L.O. and Jordan, the P.L.O., with Egyptian direction, began to carry out sabotage and subversive activities in Jordan with the intent of undermining internal security there. This was done in co-operation with the Syrians and the "Fatah."

c. Egypt, intending to utilize the P.L.O. against Jordan, allows it to execute sabotage in Israel as well in order to preserve its control, and the P.L.O.'s control, of the Palestine issue in the inter-Arab struggle. At the same time, Egypt continues its opposition to carrying out sabotage directly from the Gaza Strip so as to avoid becoming involved with Israel.

22. The P.L.O.'s assistance to sabotage activities include:

a. The P.L.O. carried out a few sabotage actions using the "Heroes of the Return", which it trained and armed. At the same time it co-operated with the "Units in the Name of Abd El Kadar El Husseini" in the execution of sabotage.

b. The propaganda line of the P.L.O. radio program that identified with the perpetration of sabotage in Israel grew stronger and the program became the mouthpiece for the proclamations of the sabotage groups connected with the P.L.O. The P.L.O. radio began to brodcast the proclaimations of the "Fatah."

c. The P.L.O. reached an agreement with the Syrians on "the mutual struggle and co-ordination of the execution of sabotage actions in Israel and Jordan," and the P.L.O. began to use Syria as a base for actions in Jordan.

d. The proclamations of the P.L.O. spokesmen and radio programs moved from support and encouragment of sabotage to statements on the execution of sabotage by units connected to the P.L.O.

23. At present, the P.L.O. policy is to present itself to the Arab world as a follower of the line of sabotage action, to state that these actions should be taken under its control and that it must prove its seriousness by carrying out sabotages itself, using bodies connected to the organization. Egypt's and the P.L.O.'s fear of Israeli reaction to sabotage activity has caused the P.L.O. to limit the number of sabotages it carries out at this time, This fear today limits the extent of P.L.O. sabotage against Israel; if the P.L.O. comes to believe that it need not fear a serious reaction from Israel, it will increase its activity.

24. From October 1966 up to February 1967, bodies connected to the P.L.O. carried out or attempted four sabotages:

a. By the "Heroes of the Return" organization

(1) During the afternoon of 19 October 1966, there was an encounter in the Ramot Nafthali area between an Israeli Border Police patrol and an armed band of 4 men operated by the "Heroes of the Return" who infiltrated from Lebanon for reconaissance purposes. In an exchange of fire, three of the band were killed and the fourth wounded and captured. The captured member of the band, Sahran Sahran admitted that he had been recruited and trained by representatives of Shafik El Hut (head of the P.L.O. office in Beirut) for infiltration into Israel and had met with El Hut for this purpose.

(2) On 28 January 1967, an explosive charge was discovered that had been laid near a building in the Beit Guvrin area (near the Jordan border) by a band operated by the "Heroes of the Return". The P.L.O. radio program admitted that the perpetrators were sent by the "Return" organization:

(a) The P.L.O. radio program of 23 January 1967 broadcast a proclamation of the "Heroes of the Return" connected with this sabotage attempt: "A band of the men of the organization crossed the Armistice Lines on 18 January 1967 into the Beit Guvrin area with the intent of blowing up a big ammunition storehouse... The fedayun succeeded in laying a big mine in the storehouse and used 15 kilograms of explosives..."

(b) The P.L.O. radio program commentator, on 24 January 1967, took pride in the fedayun action in Beit Guvrin and stated: "The fedayun who operate on behalf of the 'Return' organization succeeded in infiltrating to the targets inside Israel and carried out their action with success. They even succeeded in returning to Jordanian territory... This shows the degree of accuracy of organization which the fedayun reached."

b. By the "Units in the Name of Abd El Kadar El Husseini"

(1) On 27 October 1966 at 8:30 p.m., a freight train from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv detonated an explosive charge attached to the railroad track. The site is near the village of Battir, south-west of Jerusalem. The charge was set by a band belonging to "Units in the Name of Abd El Kadar El Husseini". Leaflets signed by "Units in the Name of Abd El Kadar El Husseini" were left near the site of the sabotage.

(2) On 26 November 1966 at about 7:30 p.m., a burst of shots were fired at a civilian automobile travelling on the road from Jerusalem to the settlement of Beit Giora, wounding the driver. A band belonging to the "Units in the Name of Abd El Kadar El Husseini" was responsible. The P.L.O. radio program of 27 November 1966 stated that "it received a proclamation from the "Units of Abd El Kadar El Husseini" that stated that fedayun forces in the name of Abd El Kadar El Husseini set out on 26 November 1966 to the Conquered Land in the Jerusalem area and attacked an Israeli patrol that was in a military vehicle on the public road. The fedayun opened automatic fire [illegible] the vehicle... the driver of the vehicle was killed..."

25. Public statements of the P.L.O. on its initiative on sabotage

a. Beginning in October 1966, the propaganda apparatus of the P.L.O. began to present the organization as the standard-bearer of sabotage in [illegible]

b. Examples of these statements are:

(1) Shukeiry stated at a Palestinian conference in Cairo (reported on the P.L.O. radio program on 24 November 1966): "The P.L.O. is no longer an organization which just mouths empty phrases, it is no longer a thing of empty hopes and dreams. The P.L.O. is now a fighting revolutionary organization which expresses deeds and sacrifice and the fedayun heroes follow in its van..."

(2) Shukeiry before Jordanian students in Cairo (reported on the P.L.O. radio program on 24 November 1966): "The fedayun will strike from time to time at Israel. They will leap forth from every hill and gulley and from every place in our land, from Akaba in the south to Ajlun in the north. They will strike in Israel by day and by night, to prove that the Palestinian nation is a nation of heroes. The fedayun will increase in numbers and weapons."

(3) Shukeiry before Palestinian students in Cairo (reported on the P.L.O. radio program on 27 November 1966): "The fedayun can and will increase in numbers and equipment... They will sweep out from behind trees and rocks, they will leap forth from every mountain and hill, by day and by night. Their numbers will grow..."

(4) Shukeiry at a public meeting in Gaza (reported on the P.L.O. radio program on 29 November 1966): "The columns of fedayun will continue their actions against the enemy, these actions will not cease from now on. Our heroes stand before two campaigns at least, one in Rabat Amon and one in Tel Aviv. The war we are participating in is a bitter and cruel war and there will be much destruction to us and to them... Our fields and their fields will go up in flames. There will be more than one battle of Samoa, but against this there will come the day of the Knesseth, the day of the Hebrew University, of Natanyia, of Tel Aviv and of Conquered Jerusalem. Blood and bullets will be the only exchange between us and the enemy."

(5) The P.L.O. radio program of 28 December 1966: The radio commentator stated that "The new stage which will bring to the victory of the People's Revolt against Hussein began with the fedayun actions in Rommema Elit, with the sabotage action on the railroad [illegible] at Battir and in the settlements of the North..."

(6) The P.L.O. radio commentator said on 30 December 1966 that "the revolutionary fedayun action is the method the PLO uses in Tel Aviv and in Jordan..."

(7) The Egyptian weekly Ahar Sa'ah of 18 January 1967, in referring to the establishment of the Revolutionary Council of the P.L.O., writes that "the revolutionary struggle and the fedayun action inside the conquered territory, the military training and organization will be carried out by the Palestinian Revolutionary Council."

26. Co-operation between the P.L.O. and Syria on sabotage activity

a. In conjunction with the subversive effort of the P.L.O. and Egypt in Jordan, from October 1966, and in view of the identity of interests with Syria on this matter, gradual co-operation between the P.L.O. and Syria was established on the topic of sabotage. There were contacts and a general co-ordination was set up between the P.L.O., and Syria and the "Fatah." Despite this, the Syrians are unwilling to give the P.L.O. the "honor" of being the standard-bearers of sabotage warfare against Israel.

b. Examples of public statements on the contacts and co-operation between the P.L.O. and Syria on the topic of sabotage:

(1) At a press conference (reported on the P.L.O. radio program on 25 October 1966) at the end of the convention of the executive committee of the P.L.O., Shukeiry stated: "The P.L.O. has sent a telegram to the president of Syria expressing the full support of the P.L.O. for the revolutionary position of Syria against the Gangster State; this is in addition to other programs which the P.L.O. suggests and which were sent to Syria by a special delegate. These programs could enable the will of the Palestinian People to fill a revolutionary liberationist role of a wider and more active scope..."

(2) The Egyptian newspaper Al Gumoriya of 6 December 1966 reported on an agreement reached between the P.L.O. and the Syrian authorities: "Shukeiry achieved, in his talks with the military and civil authorities in Damascus, a signed agreement called the Agreement for the United Struggle which will be carried out by the sons of the Syrian People and the sons of the Palestinian People."

c. A leaflet left by a Syrian sabotage band near the site of the sabotage at Dishon (13/14 January 1966) identifies itself with a group in the name of a Syrian officer, Shuroru, and refers to the "Units in the Name of Abd El Kadar El Husseini": "The Group of the Martyr Abd El Latif Shuroru sends greetings to the Group of the Martyr Abd El Kadar El Husseini and promises to fight until the final victory."

Conclusion

27. The main factor standing behind the sabotage activity is Syria which:

a. Operates the "Fatah" and its Palestine commando units for this purpose

b. Directs propaganda to encourage the execution of sabotage and attempts to create an atmosphere which will make it difficult to oppose them

c. Is the only Arab state until now which serves as a strong base for sabotage activities against Israel.

28. The other Arab states oppose sabotage warfare at the present time because of their evaluation of the danger to them inherent in this activity. The vast majority of the sabotages from the beginning of 1965 and until now were carried out by the Syrians and "Fatah."

29. However, in the past months there has been a change in regard to the P.L.O. Groups connected to it have carried out a small number of sabotage actions and the P.L.O. has begun to identify completely—in its propaganda—with the policy of sabotage.

30. The new line of the P.L.O. on the issue of sabotage was, no doubt, taken with the agreement and approval of Egypt. It seems it is intended to safeguard the P.L.O.'s activist status in the Arab world against the "Fatah" and the Syrians. The P.L.O. has also begun a certain co-operation with the "Fatah" and the Syrians.

31. For Israel:

a. The problem of sabotage is mainly with Syria

b. The problem is to limit the desire and willingness of other bodies to carry out sabotage and to prevent them from being "infected" with the idea of sabotage warfare. This holds for the Arab states as well.

c. To bring Syria to change its policy and refrain from sabotage.

SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES 3 January 1965 - 16 March 1967

TABLE OF DATA

	Details / Saboteurs came from:	3 Jan. 65 - 8 Nov. 65					23 Jan. 66 - 29 Dec. 66						3 Jan. 67 - 16 March 67					Total of period 3 Jan. 65 - 16 March 67		
		MINING	SABOTAGE	ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE	KILLED	WOUNDED	MINING	SABOTAGE	ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE	KILLED	KILLED	WOUNDED	MINING	SABOTAGE	ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE	KILLED	WOUNDED	TOTAL OPERATIONS	KILLED	WOUNDED
1	SYRIA	-	-	-	-	-	15	5	3	-	7	17	4	-	1	-	1	28	7	18
2	JORDAN	3	21	5	-	16	7	7	1	2	3	19	2	3	2	-	-	53	3	35
3	GAZA STRIP	3	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	7
4	LEBANON	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	3	2	1	2	9	1	2
	TOTAL	6	24	5	-	23	22	12	5	2	10	36	6	6	5	1	2	93	11	62

L I S T O F S A B O T A G E A C T S F R O M A R A B C O U N T R I E S

3 January 1965 - 16 March 1967

No.	LOCATION	DATE	DETAILS	SABOTEURS CAME FROM:	ISRAELI CASUALTIES Killed	Wounded	REMARKS
1	EILABUN	3 Jan. 65	Attempted sabotage of National Water Carrier	Jordan			An explosive charge was discovered and removed
2	NEHUSHA	7 Jan. 65	Attempted sabotage of water well	Jordan			An explosive charge was discovered and removed. In an encounter after the sabotage one of the group was wounded and captured
3	ARAD	20 Jan. 65	Attempted sabotage of water reservoir	Jordan			An explosive charge was discovered and removed
4	EIN HASHLOSHA	8 Feb. 65	Military command-car destroyed by mine	Gaza Strip		7 soldiers	
5	NAHAL OZ	18 Feb. 65	Mining of patrol road	Gaza Strip			The mine was discovered and removed
6	KISSUFIM	20 Feb. 65	Mining of patrol road	Gaza Strip			The mine was discovered and removed
7	KFAR HESS	27 Feb. 65	Sabotage of buildings	Jordan			A dwelling house and a silo damaged
8	KANAIM	2 March 65	Sabotage of gas well	Jordan			The well was damaged
9	ARAVAH Road	8 March 65	Sabotage of culvert	Jordan			The culvert was damaged
10	AMATSYA	16 March 65	Sabotage of water tanker	Jordan			The tanker was damaged
11	RAMAT HAKOVESH	25 May 65	Sabotage of two dwelling houses	Jordan		4 civilians	The two houses were damaged
12	AFULA	27 May 65	Sabotage of dwelling house	Jordan		3 civilians	A woman and two children were injured; the house was damaged
13	BEIT GUVRIN	1 June 65	Sabotage of water reservoir	Jordan			The reservoir was breached in two places
14	YIFTAH	2 June 65	Sabotage of dwelling house	Lebanon			The house was damaged
15	MASSUA	4 June 65	Sabotage of forestry observatory	Jordan			Two floors of the observatory were damaged
16	BATTIR	4 July 65	Sabotage of railway	Jordan			An electric detonator was used, the wires led across the Jordan border
17	EIN TAMAR	8 July 65	Sabotage of water control installation	Jordan			The pipe was breached
18	BEIT NIR	25 July 65	Sabotage of water reservoir	Jordan			The reservoir was breached in two places and emptied of water
19	EYAL	30 July 65	Sabotage of two buildings	Jordan			Both buildings had external damage
20	AVIEZER	4 Aug. 65	Police truck damaged by mine	Jordan		4 police	

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No.	LOCATION	DATE	DETAILS	SABOTEURS CAME FROM:	ISRAELI CASUALTIES Killed	Wounded	REMARKS
21	MANARA	26 Aug. 65	Sabotage of water pipeline	Lebanon			The pipe was breached
22	REVAYA	30 Aug. 65	Sabotage of water pipeline	Jordan			The pipe was damaged
23	EYAL	1 Sept. 65	Sabotage of water pumping station	Jordan			The pipe was badly damaged
24	ADURAIM Road	6 Sept. 65	Military command-car damaged by mine	Jordan		5 soldiers	
25	ADDERET	19 Sept. 65	Sabotage of building	Jordan			A wall was demolished
26	HAMADYA	19 Sept. 65	Sabotage of water pumping station	Jordan			A wall of the station was damaged
27	ROSH HAAYIN	28 Sept. 65	Sabotage of drainage pumping station	Jordan			A wall of the station was breached in two places
28	METZER	28 Sept. 65	Sabotzge of water pipeline	Jordan			The pipeline was breached
29	AMATSYA	29 Sept. 65	Attempted sabotage of water pump	Jordan			One member of the sabotage band was killed in encounter with IDF unit
30	ZANO'AH	2 Oct. 65	Sabotage of two dwelling houses	Jordan			The houses were damaged. At the time of the explosion, there were 11 persons, including 8 children, in the buildings
31	MARGALIYOT	27 Oct. 65	Sabotage of dwelling house	Lebanon			The building was damaged
32	ADURAIM Road	27 Oct. 65	Mining of patrol road	Jordan			The mine was discovered and removed
33	ROSH HA'AYIN	31 Oct. 65	Sabotage of water pumping station	Jordan			The pumping station was seriously damaged
34	GIVAT YESHAYAHU	7 Nov. 65	Sabotage of dwelling house	Jordan			The building was damaged
35	BATTIR	8 Nov. 65	Attempted sabotage of railway	Jordan			An electric detonator was used, the wires led across the Jordan border
36	KFAR YUVAL	23 Jan. 66	Sabotage of water reservoir	Syria			The reservoir was damaged
37	MA'AYAN BARUKH	7 Feb. 66	Sabotage of water pipeline	Syria			The pipe was damaged
38	HAGOSHRIM	7 Feb. 66	Attempted sabotage of bridge	Syria			An explosive charge was discovered and removed
39	EIN YAHAV	11 April 66	Sabotage of water pumping station	Jordan			The pump was damaged
40	MA'AYAN BARUKH	18 April 66	Tractor destroyed by mine	Syria		1 civilian	

No.	LOCATION	DATE	DETAILS	SABOTEURS CAME FROM:	ISRAELI CASUALTIES Killed	Wounded	REMARKS
41	BEIT YOSEF	25 April 66	Sabotage of 3 dwelling houses, water pump and sheep pen	Jordan		2 civilians	The buildings, which also housed children, were damaged. The pumping station was badly damaged
42	ARAD-MASSADA Road	28 April 66	Mining of tourist route, truck damaged by mine	Jordan			The truck was carrying people on an excursion. A bus of tourists, including children, had travelled the same road just before the truck that detonated the mine
43	KFAR GILADI	30 April 66	Attempted sabotage of two dwelling houses	Syria			The saboteurs infiltrated through Lebanon. Five explosive charges were discovered and removed
44	EIN YAHAV	5 May 66	Sabotage of water pipeline	Jordan			The pipeline was damaged
45	ZARIT	16 May 66	Attempted sabotage of agricultural equipment	Lebanon			Three explosive charges were discovered and removed
46	ALMAGOR	16 May 66	Civilian vehicle destroyed by mine	Syria	2 civilians		A J.N.F. jeep was destroyed. The mine was laid in a cultivated field
47	EYAL	18 May 66	Attempted sabotage of railway	Jordan			An obstacle on the tracks was discovered and removed
48	HAR HOLAD	27 June 66	Military vehicle damaged by mine	Jordan		2 soldiers	The mine was planted on a patrol route
49	METULLA	12 July 66	Sabotage of insecticide storehouse	Syria			The saboteurs infiltrated through Lebanon. Building was damaged
50	ALMAGOR	13 July 66	Military command car damaged by mine	Syria	1 soldier, 1 civilian	2 soldiers	
51	MAHANAYIM	13 July 66	Tractor destroyed by mine	Syria		1 civilian	
52	KFAR YUVAL	14 July 66	Sabotage of a dwelling house	Syria			The saboteurs infiltrated through Lebanon. The house was damaged and an additional charge was discovered and removed
53	MARGALIYOT	19 July 66	Sabotage of a chicken coop and attempted sabotage of 2 buildings and a tractor	Syria			The saboteurs infiltrated through Lebanon. The structure was demolished. Eight additional charges were discovered and removed
54	METULLA	25 July 66	Explosion of a hand-grenade booby-trap	Syria		1 civilian	The booby-trap was set by saboteurs who infiltrated through Lebanon on 12 July 66. A woman was wounded
55	SHA'AR YESHUV Area	6 Sept. 66	Tractor and trailer damaged by mine	Syria		6 civilians	The mining was perpetrated by persons who came from the Syrian army position at Tel Azazziat

No.	LOCATION	DATE	DETAILS	SABOTEURS CAME FROM:	ISRAELI CASUALTIES Killed	Wounded	REMARKS
56	KFAR YUVAL	7 Sept. 66	Encounter with band of saboteurs	Syria			Two saboteurs were killed, two others escaped
57	SHA'AR YESHUV	9 Sept. 66	Military vehicle damaged by mine	Syria		3 soldiers	The sappers came from the Syrian Army position at Tel Azazziat
58	ARAD-MASSADA Road	12 Sept. 66	Sabotage of water pipeline	Jordan			The pipe was damaged
59	DEAD SEA WORKS	24 Sept. 66	Sabotage of transformer	Jordan			The transformer was damaged
60	JERUSALEM	8 Oct. 66	Sabotage of dwelling house	Jordan		4 civilians	Three demolition charges exploded damaging the building; a fourth was discovered and removed
61	SHA'AR HAGOLAN	8 Oct. 66	Sabotage of storehouse and trailer; police jeep destroyed by mine	Syria	4 policemen	2 policemen	The storehouse and trailer were demolished
62	MA'AYAN BARUKH	11 Oct. 66	Mining of cultivated field	Syria			Mine was discovered and removed
63	NEHUSHA	14 Oct. 66	Ambush of military vehicle	Jordan		3 soldiers	
64	SHA'AR YESHUV Area	18 Oct. 66	Military vehicle damaged by mine	Syria		1 soldier	Sappers came from the Syrian army position at Tel Azazziat
65	EIN GEDI	21 Oct. 66	Sabotage of building	Jordan			The building was damaged
66	SHA'AR YESHUV Area	23 Oct. 66	Military vehicle damaged by mine	Syria			Sappers came from the Syrian army position at Tel Azazziat
67	BATTIR	27 Oct. 66	Sabotage of freight train and firing on train	Jordan		1 civilian	2 locomotives and 2 cars derailed Track blocked and traffic halted for 3 days. Leaflet of "Unit in Name of Abdl Kadar el-Husseini"found
68	ARAD-MASSADA Road	30 Oct. 66	Sabotage of water pipeline	Jordan			The pipeline was damaged
69	SHA'AR YESHUV Area	1 Nov. 66	Civilian truck damaged by mine	Syria			Sappers came from the Syrian army position at Tel Azazziat
70	SHA'AR YESHUV Area	4 Nov. 66	Mining of patrol road	Syria			The mine discovered and removed
71	HAR HETSRON Area	12 Nov. 66	Military command-car destroyed by mine	Jordan	3 soldiers	6 soldiers	
72	BAR GIORA Road	26 Nov. 66	Attack on civilian vehicle	Jordan		1 civilian	The car and its driver were hit by gunfire
73	LAKHISH Area	9 Dec. 66	Mining of patrol road	Jordan			Mine discovered and removed, at site "Fatah" leaflet found
74	ADURAIM R[illegible]	9 Dec. 66	Mining of patrol road	Jordan			Mine discovered and removed, at site "Fatah" leaflet found
75	DAN Area	28 Dec. 66	Mining of patrol road	Syria			Mine discovered and removed
76	DAN Area	29 Dec. 66	Mining of patrol road	Syria			Mine discovered and removed

No.	LOCATION	DATE	DETAILS	ORIGIN OF GANG	ISR. CASUALTIES Killed	Wounded	REMARKS
77	ADAMIT Area	3 Jan. 67	Sabotage of J.N.F. storehouse	Lebanon			The structure was damaged
78	DISHON	13-14 Jan. 67	Sabotage of water pumping station and mining of soccer field	Syria	1 civilian	2 civilians	Pumping station damaged. 2 anti-personnel mines planted on the field: one was detonated during soccer match causing casualties second discovered. Saboteurs retreated across Syrian border to Tel Hillal position. Leaflet of "Unit in Name of Abdul Latif Shoruru"(who was Syrian army officer) was found.
79	ADAMIT Area	15 Jan. 67	Sabotage of culvert	Lebanon			Culvert and section of road damaged
80	TEL KATZIR Area	16 Jan. 67	Mining of cultivated field	Syria			3 mines discovered and removed
81	KFAR SOLD Area	20 Jan. 67	Mining of patrol road	Syria			Mine discovered and removed
82	SHA'AR YESHUV Area	27 Jan. 67	Mining of patrol road	Syria			Mine discovered and removed
83	BEIT GUVRIN Area	28 Jan. 67	Attempted sabotage of abandoned building	Jordan			An explosive charge was discovered and removed
84	ARAB EL-ARAMSHA	6 Feb. 67	Attempted sabotage of Bedouin schoolhouse	Lebanon			An explosive charge was discovered and removed
85	AMATSYA Area	6 Feb. 67	Mining of patrol road	Jordan			Mine discovered and removed
86	LAKHISH Area	8 Feb. 67	Mining of patrol road	Jordan			Mine discovered and removed. "Fatah" leafled found at site
87	ZARIT Area	15 Feb. 67	Mining of dirt road and encounter with saboteurs	Lebanon			The band retreated; sabotage materials and Syrian army equipment found
88	NOTERA Area	18 Feb. 67	Encounter with Syrian band	Syria			One Syrian soldier was killed; the body returned to Syrians
89	ARAD Area	19 Feb. 67	Sabotage of water pipeline	Jordan			"Fatah" leaflet found at site
90	NOTERA Area	3 March 67	Tractor damaged by mine on Ma'atz Road	Syria	1 civilian		Tractor operator seriously wounded
91	D'VIR Area	12 March 67	Sabotage of railway to Beersheva	Jordan			The tracks were damaged; "Fatah" leaflet found at site
92	YARHIV Area	14 March 67	Encounter with band of saboteurs	Jordan			Tin of explosives found at site of encounter
93	ARAD	16 March 67	Sabotage of water installation	Jordan	2 soldiers		Two saboteurs killed after pursuit. One of the two went back and forth between Jordan and Syria a number of times recently (according to his passport)

SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES AND MINING IN THE MOUNT HEBRON AREA — 9 DEC, 66 — 16 MARCH 67

List of Activities

1. LAKHISH Area — 9 Dec. 66 — Mining of patrol road — The mine was discovered and removed
2. ADURAIM Road — 9 Dec. 66 — Mining of patrol road — Mine discovered and removed
3. BEIT GUVRIN Area — 28 Jan. 67 — Attempted sabotage of abandoned building — Demolition charges discovered and removed
4. AMATZIA Area — 5 Feb. 67 — Mining near the patrol road — Mine discovered and removed
5. LAKHISH Area — 8 Feb. 67 — Mining of patrol road — Mine discovered and removed
6. ARAD Area — 19 Feb. 67 — Sabotage of water pipeline — No damage was caused
7. D'VIR Area — 12 March 67 — Sabotage of the railway to Beersheva — 10 demolition charges were set; two rails were cut in a number of places
8. ARAD — 16 March 67 — Sabotage of the town's water installation — The water pipeline to the town was damaged and the water supply to the town cut off for a number of hours



LEGEND

ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE +--+--+

ROAD

RAILWAY

SABOTAGE/MINING SITE

SCALE: 10 KM. 5 0

SABOTAGE OF KIRYAT-GAT — BEER-SHEVA RAILWAY

12 MARCH 67

ENCOUNTER WITH SABOTAGE BAND YARHIV AREA
13 MARCH 67



SABOTAGE OF WATER INSTALLATION AT ARAD

16 MARCH-67

RESTRICTED

(4)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BRUSSELS.
21 JUN 1967
19 June 1967.

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(10727)

Dear Eastern Department,

... I enclose herewith a typed copy of a letter received in manuscript from Mahmud Jachbir "Leader of Free Palestine Arab Democrat Government in Exile".

2. We are making enquiries about him here. Meanwhile we should be glad of any information you can give us about him.

3. We have not so far sent an acknowledgement to his letter and should like to know whether, and if so in what terms, we should do so.

Yours ever,

John Drinkall

(J. K. Drinkall)

(2) Mr. Saunders

Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

(1) P.W. Mr

RESTRICTED

25/6

BRUXELLES 8.6.1967

Mahmud Jachbir,
Leader of Free Palestine
Arab Democrat Government
in Exile

Ex-General Palestine Liberation Army,
Executive Political Administrator,
Palestine Liberation Organisation

Temporary address: Belgium
106 avenue Duepetiaux,
Bruxelles 6 - Belgium.

His Excellency Mr. George Brown,
Foreign Secretary U.K.
c/o The Honourable
Ambassador of Great Britain,
Bruxelles - Belgium.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to submit my compliments for the respective Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, and this occasion would like to draw your Government attention for the following very important movement which have been organized in the Middle East, as pro-west and Democratic elements to support the Western Powers in facing the Communism and to consider the nationalism movements organised in secretly by the U.S.S.R. through their agent in the Middle East called Jamah Abdul Nasser, the "Pharoh" of Egypt of the 20th Century.

2) Your Excellency,

After the Israeli attacks on Sammoa village situated at the Province of Hebron, south of Jerusalem where 385 victims from the innocent refugees who are settled on the frontier with Israel, a wave of suffering from the miserable situation of the Palestinians and thus many senior officers who were in the Liberation Army had secretly met and formed the Free Palestine Arab Democrat Front amongst these officers were Brigadier General M. Abou Ghazaheh Commandant of "ALASSIFA" Commandos in Syria, Brigadier General Mohamed Ibrahim Al-Shaer Commandant of "AL-FATEM" Commandos, Colonel Ibrahim Shami Commandant i/c of the 2nd Infantry Division in Gaza Strip, and some very important members of the Executive Political Committee of The Palestine Liberation Organisation as Doctor Mohamed Ali Dokkag, Dr. Mohamed Oudeh, Dr. Mohamed Dahshaw, Jamil tref Hassan Said, and Advocate Amin Elias Taweel, and we have organised an "inside" group inside the Palestine Liberation Army and The Palestine Organisation and we decided:

/1)

1) The Palestinians should struggle peacefully through UNO for self-determination according to the U.N. General Assembly declaration of 29th November 1947

2) No ties at all with U.S.S.R. and Iron Curtains as well as no ties with Communist China

3) Approaching the Western Powers to create good relationship on democratical basis.

4) Announcing of "Free Palestine Arab Democratic Government in Exile and to approach UNO for recognition.

5) To contact Israel at once and prepare the necessary measures and steps for direct serious negociations for creating permanent peace, as we are the representatives of the main party by sitting on a conference table with Israeli delegates in Paris or in Geneva.

6) Apply for UNO to order the delivery of Gaza Strip from Nasser, and West Bank of Jordan River of Jordan from Hussein, and the Northern Jalili sectors captured by the Syrian Army in North of Palestine.

7) Organisation of an administrative Government in these parts under the Mandate of the U.N., and to hold elections for Chambre of Deputies, and forming a government, and receiving economical aids from U,N.O., and through our compensations from Israel.

8) Forming a national Guards of 40,000 persons to keep the Public Security and restoring peace serious treaty permanently with Israel.

Your Excellency,

On These terms, delegation consisted of 3 persons under my chairmanship had arrived to Paris on 10.1.1967, where first contact with Israeli officials in the Israeli Embassy at Paris had really been effected under secret code "MORRIS & TOUKAN". The Israeli had showed a very good interest in this movement, and suggested further meeting on 20/21/1/1967 for "points-clearing". Thus the delegates Brigadeir Mohamed Abu Ghazaleh and Dr. Mohamed Ali Dakkag had left to Geneva, and on 20/21 January 1967, a firm acceptance of Israel to "go ahead" with top political meeting which was expected to take place in Geneva on 15.4.1967 and nearly the delegation members were switched and we had convinced Lt. General Majech El-Madani to fly to Geneva on 13/4 on sick-medical examination vacancy, to join our meetings as well as we were notified by the Notables Israelians including Mrs. Abba Ebban, Moshe Dayan, Menahem Begen, Lt.General Robin, Rafael Gedeon, Elia Sasoun.

On 14/1/1967, Israeli officials in Tel Aviv by good-will informed U.S.A. confidentially with our movement, that time U.S.A. was thinking that Jordan King is a sincere friend, and thus they informed him. The King hold urgently a cabinet meeting and asked Wasfi al Tell, the Jordan Primer to held a press conference and to express to public opinion this dare and dangerous

/movement

and thus Al-Tell discovered our /movement and told that P.L.D. Leaders under my chairmanship are talking with Israel.

So on 16/3/1967 I found myself in Belgium and applied for Political Refugee by a written application addressed to His Excellency the Primer of Belgium M. Vanden Boeynants and my application is still under consideration of The Belgian Justice Authorities as appeared in the letters I have in hand from the Belgian Primer no. CZ 28.201/14/E1/E10 - 30.5.67 and CZ.28.201/14 of 1.6.1967 and also in the letter of Minister d'affaires Etrangères of Belgium no. Aff-ju 6/2480 of 5.6.1967.

Your Excellency,

Jordan Authorities claimed that I have a revoked passport, and thus I have been on 19/3/1967 arrested for "illegal sejours and faut passport" and detained without trial until today with a warrant of Arrest no.116 - 20/3/1967.

Since I have been arrested it happened that some legal procedures are traced by the Belgian Justice, which if any proof may be discovered I must be brought before Court, which I hope it will not be so long.

This is exactly the situation. The meeting with Israelians on 15.4.1967 was adjourned under this arrest, also I wrote to President Johnson on 15/5/1967 warned him of the intense crisis of the Middle East, and asked him to reconsider the U.S.A. position with Jordan because Hussein is not sincere to Western powers, and also few weeks I wrote to Mr. Eugen Rostow, the Under Secretary of U.S.A. Department of State on the subject.

Today, I am writing to your excellency requesting the United Kingdom will consider our movement and if possible that the United Kingdom will accept me to have a political shelter in England and by the meantime I am putting myself under the disposition of the U.K. Service, and I shall be as well as alway a good friend to Great Britain, the Honorable Kingdom which is actually considered as one of the most important fortress of the Free Democracy and Free-World Leadership.

Awaiting your excellency's reply,
Thanking you in anticipation

Yours very faithfully,

(signed) M. Jachbir

N.B. I appreciate and welcome the visit of any British Embassy's officials to talk and produce documents.

RESTRICTED

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BRUSSELS.
22 June 1967.

(1009J)

Dear Eastern Department,

Please refer to my letter no. 10727 of 19 June about Mahmud Jachbir.

2. The Belgian authorities tell us that the person who has been writing these letters to us (we have now received two more which I am not forwarding) is an imposter. There is a pparently a real Mahmud Jaghbir (not Jachbir) who lives in Paris, and who recently reported the loss of his passport. The writer of the letters appears to be a thoroughly unsavoury character, but I will not bother you with the details.

3. We should however still like to know what you think of the Palestinian organisation which this person has claimed to represent.

4. In order that the writer of these letters should not have any grounds for accusing the Belgian authorities of withholding his letters, I have sent one brief formal acknowledgement of receipt of them all.

Yours ever,

John Drinkall

(J. K. Drinkall)

Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN ARC[illegible]
10 JUL 1967
E2/4.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

7 July, 1967.

E 2/4

The Free Palestine Arab Democrat Government in Exile

In your letter No. 1009J of 22 June you enquired about this organisation.

2. Neither we nor Research Department had heard of it. It is possible that Jaghbir was formerly connected in some way, as he says, with the Palestine Liberation Army and the Palestine Liberation Organisation and that for unknown reasons he left them to set up his own organisation. As you may imagine there are a number of splinter groups whose professed aims are to pursue the Palestine cause. Unfortunately some of them exist mostly to serve their own interests and it is possible that Jaghbir falls into that category.

3. Since you have sent him a simple acknowledgment we suggest that no further action is required.

(J.C. Moberly)

J.K. Drinkall, Esq.,
Brussels.

[illegible] RESTRICTED

Registry No.

Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Open.

AE 3

Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No 1
10 JUL 1967

Draft.

To:

J.K. Drinkall,
Brussels.

[Flag A]

From:

Mr. J.C.Moberly.

Jaghbir

Mr. Moberly has (unwittingly written)

5/7

The Free Palestine Arab Democrat Government in Exile.

In your letter No. 1009J of 22 June you enquired about this organisation.

2. Neither we nor Research Department had ~~have ever~~ heard of it. It is possible that was ~~that he~~/formerly connected in some way, as he says, with the Palestine Liberation Army and the Palestine Liberation Organisation and that for unknown reasons he left them to set up his own organisation. As you may imagine there are a number of splinter groups whose/aims professed are to pursue the Palestine cause. Unfortunately some of them exist ~~only~~ mostly to serve their own interests and it is possible that Jaghbir falls into that category.

3. Since you have sent him a simple acknowledgment we suggest that no further action is required.

J. C. M.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Reference M (4 + 5)

J.R.?

(McPaul)

I have not heard of this organisation, and would be glad of your comments. Since Bounds have sent an acknowledgment I see no need for further action with Jaghbir (- which still sounds wrong - ? Jabir, Jaabir etc) but we must answer para. 3

Mr. Saunders

Now here we think it possible that the FPAD & Mahmud Jaghbir. The wife is in exile may be the Iranian child that he claims to see -

30/6

Ed (1626)

ex-Board of the RCA which
makes recommendations that he
may have held some junior rank
in it which he was found out not
to be fit.

2. Baghdad. Through not
common is, I think, correct.

2nd.

3 Feb 42.

Draft submitted

5/7

10, DOWNING STREET, S.W.1

PRIVATE SECRETARY

Foreign Office.....

The attached communication addressed to the Prime Minister is transmitted to you to be dealt with in whatever manner is considered appropriate by the Department concerned. It refers to previous correspondence which was forwarded to you on.....XXXXXXXXXXXX.....

1. No acknowledgment has been sent from here.

---

2. A plain acknowledgment has been sent from here, adding that the communication has been forwarded to XXXXXXXXXXXX your Department.

---

3. A copy of the acknowledgment which has been sent from here is attached.

See previous correspondence.

P.A.

Date 27.7.67

31/7

General Mahmud Jaghbir,
Chief " Palestinians Democratic
Front " Middle East.
106 Avenue Dupetiaux,
Bruxelles 6 - Belgium.

Bruxelles, 23.7.1967.

L26

LAST PAPER

NAFO

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No 15
31 JUL 1967
E2/4.

His Excellency.
Mr. Harold Wilson,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
10 Downing Street, London.

LAST PAPER

Your Excellency Mr. Prime,

I very much appriciated the traditional practical views of the respective British Government and specially the initiatives concerning the Middle East Crisis and the last combat situation which has changed substantially all the plans of the United States in the Orient, and unfortunately Great Britain had been pushed in; through the untrue. sincerity, and unfaithful behaviour of the Jordan little Monarch who fabricated the story of the Anglo-American Air-Cover to Israel. which was the main reason to involve the U.K. in the Problem.

I am wandering what your Excellency's thoughts would be in the light of our joint Arabo-Israelian declaration, which was issued by the Palestinians Democratic Front and the Israelian Socialist Organization on 3rd june, 1967. which was published on 8-6-1967 on "The Times" London edition - No 56962, and recent developments concerning possibilities of negotiating with Israel for some sort of restoration of our

page 2) rights and compensation for lost property.

Isreal has been existed to live, and we the Palestinians Arabs Democrats also require to exist our Palestine Arab State which the United Nations General Assembly had decided on the 29th. November 1947, because we the palestinians Democrats don't like that we must be always the victims of every combat as well as we have no more patience to be any more the "Milking Cow" to any Pro-Russian Leaders...!!

It would not be possible any more for the West Bank of the Jordan, nor the Gaza Strip to be developed in any way that would make the lives of the people; and specially the 1.500.000 Stateless and displaced Arab Refugees who are receiving the aids of the U.N.R.W.A. since 1948, and after the last Combat of 5 June, 67, better and more complete, because the Palestinians Arabs had lost their confidence in any leadership in the Middle East, and the Combats of 1948/1956/1967 had gave us very good lessons, although we paid the price-cost of our blind-confidence, for the last 20 years, very high and our victims statistics give a good proof of these payments, where in 1948 the Palestinians lost 2400 victims, in 1956 lost 13.500 victims, and in 1967 31.600 victims, who were killed during the Combats operations.

What really the Arab Nations feel today after the Combat? There is no doubt that the Arab Nations are willing to see Palestine an Arab State, and ofcourse Isreal has no objection that the Palestinians must have their state but on the conditions of having peace with the neighbouring Arab States.

Page 3) The Arab Nations desire too-much to See an indepen-
ent Palestine Arab Goverment which will administrate
Palestine even under the Mandate of the U.N.O. for
3 years, until the Palestinians can held democratic
elections, where thereafter a palestine Government repres-
ent the Palestine Nation and arrange for indepeendance
and Self-determination, is existed on the basis of the
29th November 1947 decision of U.N.O.

The Arab Nations today are anxious too-much
because of the penetration of the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East,
Specially after the small arab ~~summit~~ conference which
took place in Cairo last week (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan,
Algérie) had agreed secretly to sign a pact with Russia
for 10 years, pending immediate obtain of
War materials from Russia Valued to nearly $ 250.000.000
guaranteed by petrol payments, and grant of
3 Russian basis, (1) in Portsaid, (2) Latika Syria,
(3) in Algère. and this is why Boumedienne and
General Aref of Iraq flew to Moscow last week,
carrying the signed agreements for the pact.

The U.S.S.R. is interesting in the empty-space
left alone to the departure of the U.S.A. + Great Britain
of the Middle East, as well as Russia is trying through
the Middle East petrol, to use it as a key to score
off the Americans, Russia is interested in penetration
through the Socialist Governments, and I am not telling
secrets if I acknowledge that within few weeks there
will be great question marks about the future of the Royal
Rule in Jordan, Saoudi Arabia and Libya, where U.S.S.R.

4) has great ambition to finish the U.S.A. and Western allies influences there? The last Cairo Summet had prepared programs and plans which been send to Russia on the promise that first to face the Israelian problem and afterwards the execution of the plans in Jordan, Saoud Arabia and Libya, some sort of the plans Military Coup-d'Etats, changing of Royal Rules into Republican Socialists, etc..!! and the U.S.S.R. dream of having Military bases in South Arabia... in Aden... 1968!!

We the Palestine Arab Democrats, before 30 years ago were given a lesson in the aims and Tactics of Nazism and Fascism. Today we are facing the communism which has infinitely more finess, operate with disciplined initiatives from the central Headquarters in Moscow, planning domination of the World. It is now the true time that all the Free World's powers should understand what that program is, for if the communists win their Political Campeign we the Democrats, are marked for execution. Extinction is as complete and Final whether the communists or the China Popular elements be the executioners..!!

However, We the Democrats of different races or views or different religions, having our tastes in Liberty, fondamental freedom and philosophy of democratical peaceful life based on human rights, although of the differences in our Political faiths, and economical theories. This diversity is our strength since our traditional lies in Freedom for the individual, there in Asia, Middle East, Africa, Europe, or South Latine America..

We the Democrats must put our faith in "the power

Page 5) of peaceful thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the Market." Our Democratic idealists insist today. That the initiative actions of the Western great powers must lies on the fact that the self-determination of a displaced Nation called the Palestinie Nation, (what soever the situation, or any U.S.S.R. intervention) should be recognised, and that the Palestinians Rights to have their own Palestine State must be daily existed in according to the United Nations General Assembly decision of 29th. November, 1947, on which Israel was recognised as a State to live ... and we the Palestinians struggling to have our state so as to live too.

So, when the Western Powers prop up governments. That are self seeking, Socialists, Nationalists, who have no faith in Democrats. The Western Powers will not lose ground in the world wide struggle against Communism.

When the Western powers stand firmly behind the progressive Democrat fronts as our Palestinians Democratic Front, the Western Powers will become in the Eyes of the peoples of the World identified with their interests. Then the Democrat Campeign, Cause, gains strength and character, and then the flood tide of communism will begin to recede in the Orient.

We the Palestinians Arabs can't afford to be dilettantes. We expect that the Western powers, will support our views since we are among the first to kindle the spark of freedom. In general our experience with Western Democracy

(Page 6) shows the bright promise, the great potential it holds. It shows that the Western Democracy can be just and yet civilized, fair to all classes exploiters of none. The survival and extension of the Democratic traditions are the great challenge of the Century.

Therefore, I am submitting my memorandum to Your Excellency, and have a great hope that a favourable constructive action concerning the Palestine Problem, can be taken by the British Government based on the very important views mentioned herewith, and I appreciate to hear a favourable reply.

With my best respectful regards,

Yours Very faithfully.

M. Jaghbir

GENERAL M. JAGHBIR
Chief Palestinians Democratic
Front.

LONDON

His Excellency
Mr. Harold Wilson,
Prime Minister of U.K.,
10 DOWNING STREET,
LONDON - ENGLAND

M. Jaghbir, 106 Avenue Secretaux,
Bruxelles 6.